Παρουσιάζουμε σήμερα σχέδιο ενημερωτικού σημειώματος της γενικής διευθύνσεως εσωτερικών πολιτικών, οικονομικών και νομισματικών υποθέσεων του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, που κυκλοφόρησε πριν λίγες ημέρες. Τίτλος του εγγράφου είναι :
ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΑΝΑΔΙΑΡΘΡΩΣΗ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΖΩΝΗ.
Στο έγγραφο αυτό παρουσιάζονται οι κίνδυνοι που διατρέχει η Γερμανία από την οικονομική κρίση στην Ελλάδα. Το πλέον ενδιαφέρον τμήμα του εγγράφου, αναφέρει 5 σενάρια, 5
προσεγγίσεις για την πλέον αποτελεσματική και λιγώτερο οδυνηρή για την Γερμανία, αντιμετώπιση της οικονομικής καταστάσεως της Ελλάδος.
προσεγγίσεις για την πλέον αποτελεσματική και λιγώτερο οδυνηρή για την Γερμανία, αντιμετώπιση της οικονομικής καταστάσεως της Ελλάδος.
ΤΑ ΤΕΣΣΕΡΑ ΣΕΝΑΡΙΑ ΠΡΟΒΛΕΠΟΥΝ ΠΤΩΧΕΥΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΕΝΑ ΠΟΥ ΠΡΟΒΛΕΠΕΙ ΑΠΟΠΛΗΡΩΜΗ ΤΩΝ ΧΡΕΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΧΩΡΑΣ ΜΑΣ, ΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΩΣ ΑΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΟΠΟΙΗΤΟ !!!
Διαβάστε στην συνέχεια, την επιγραμματική παρουσίαση των σεναρίων στα ελληνικά, και δεν νομίζω ότι θα δυσκολευθείτε να αποφασίσετε τι πρόκειται να συμβεί.
ΤΑ 5 ΣΕΝΑΡΙΑ
ΣΕΝΑΡΙΟ 1
Πλήρης εξόφληση των δανειακών υποχρεώσεων της Ελλάδος, προς την ευρωζώνη. Το σενάριο αυτό κρίνεται ως απραγματοποίητο. Χαρακτηριστική είναι η δήλωση του κ. Thomas Mayer, επικεφαλής οικονομολόγου της Deutsche Bank : «Θα πρέπει να συμβεί κάποιο θαύμα ώστε να μπορέσει η Ελλάς να επιστρέψει στις αγορές στο εγγύς μέλλον. Θα πρέπει να βρεθεί πετρέλαιο στο Αιγαίο ή κάτι ανάλογο»
ΣΕΝΑΡΙΟ 2
Ήπια αναδιάρθρωση χρέους. Το 1/3 των δανείων από την ευρωζώνη θα εξοφληθούν. (η ζημιά για την Γερμανία εκτιμάται σε 38 δις ευρώ)
ΣΕΝΑΡΙΟ 3
Κανένα δάνειο από την ευρωζώνη δεν θα εξοφληθεί. (η ζημιά για την Γερμανία εκτιμάται σε 56.1 δις ευρώ)
ΣΕΝΑΡΙΟ 4
Άμεση αναδιάρθρωση του ελληνικού χρέους. Αν υποτεθεί ότι γίνεται «κούρεμα» του ελληνικού χρέους κατά 50%, η χώρα μας ΘΑ ΕΠΩΦΕΛΗΘΕΙ, το χρέος της θα μειωθεί σημαντικά και ύστερα από μικρό χρονικό διάστημα, οι αγορές θα ανοίξουν πάλι για την Ελλάδα. Στα τέλη το 2013, η Ελλάς θα έχει επανέλθει στις αγορές και με προοπτικές αναπτύξεως που θα της επιτρέψουν να αποπληρώσει το υπόλοιπο του χρέους της. (η ζημιά για την Γερμανία εκτιμάται σε 36.9 δις ευρώ)
ΣΕΝΑΡΙΟ 5
Εξάπλωση της κρίσεως. Αναδιάρθρωση χρέους Ελλάδος, Ιρλανδίας και Πορτογαλίας.(η ζημιά για την Γερμανία εκτιμάται σε 42.3 δις ευρώ).
Παραθέτουμε στην συνέχεια την πλήρη ανάλυση των 5 σεναρίων, όπως αυτά περιγράφονται στο έγγραφο του ευρωπαϊκού κοινοβουλίου, καθώς και τρείς σημαντικές κατά την γνώμη μας, επισημάνσεις
Παραθέτουμε στην συνέχεια την πλήρη ανάλυση των 5 σεναρίων, όπως αυτά περιγράφονται στο έγγραφο του ευρωπαϊκού κοινοβουλίου, καθώς και τρείς σημαντικές κατά την γνώμη μας, επισημάνσεις
Και τα αρχικά κείμενα στα Αγγλικά
3. THE DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
Business as usual: Scenario 1-3
To obtain an estimate of the cost of the crisis, different scenarios are examined. They lead to specific numerical results dependent
on the set of assumptions.
Scenario 1: Full repayment
In this scenario loans are granted repeatedly within a period of 5 year and Greece is assumed to be able to return to the capital markets and repay all its loans immediately in 2015. We assume a Greek “retained amount” (own contribution) of EUR 5 billion per year stemming from privatisation proceeds. Hence, Greece is assumed to be quite successful in selling state-owned
enterprises, but not to the extent aimed at (EUR 50 billion), but only by half. The German taxpayer would have been made liable for the Greek rescue at the amount of EUR 19.2 billion. This appears to be quite cheap and the costs are mainly due to the implementation of the ESM. What is more, at first glance scenario 1 turns out to be the cheapest variant. However, some critics – mostly defenders of the “business as usual” scenario- might ask why the costs of scenario 1 are still so high. The latter mainly results from the fact that we see the cash deposit in the ESM as lost since we assume that the ESM will become a permanent institution. The cash deposit is actually designated for the implementation of the ESM. The latter is a new institution which would not have been given birth without the EU debt crisis and, hence, has to be ascribed to the crisis. Germany cannot dispose of the deposit anymore, except in the case of a dissolution of the ESM. However, there could be interest paid on the deposit. But in this case costs resulting from additional loan taking have to be counted against these potential interest gains. Hence, one could not pretend that the deposit can be paid from the abundant tax revenues. The opportunity costs of the deposit are huge. In any case, the German taxpayer is financially liable for it. As an alternative, for instance, the value added tax could have been lowered by three percentage points in Germany. But the discounted costs of the deposit do represent not more than a level effect under the different scenarios. The assumption of a permanent ESM is not unrealistic even under scenario 1 according to which Greece will recover from scratch. The public choice literature makes it overall plausible that there are ratchet effects in the existence of
institutions. Once they are created, it will be quite difficult to get rid of them. But our scenario 1 is not overly realistic anymore (this view was valid at least until 3 June 2011, the day when the Troika quite surprisingly announced that Greece is on a proper way to meet its obligations within the adjustment programme). Thomas Mayer, chief economist of Deutsche Bank expressed it in the following way: ‘It would have been a miracle to happen for Greece in the near future to be able to return to the markets again. Oil should be found in the Aegean or the like’ (Nienhaus, 2011).
Scenario 3: No EU loan will be paid back
However, in the recent months it has become more and more likely that Greece will not recover and not pay back any loan from the first EU rescue package. Greece might default on the EU loans in 2015, i.e. on loans already disbursed and on the refinancing needs in the coming 4 years, i.e. the refinancing granted until2015. In this case, the costs for Germany would amount to EUR 56.1 billion.
Scenario 2 – “Soft debt restructuring” – 1/3 of EU loans will be paid back
In an intermediate scenario Greece will only serve one third of its refinancing needs. In this realistic case, the costs for Germany will increase to EUR 38 billion. But this calculation appears to be too optimistic as well, since it assumes that privatisations are pushed through without any significant resistance. Moreover, ‘soft restructuring’ might represent the worst solution at all with an eye on the fact that the ECB continues to lend against sovereign bonds of the defaulting country. This would clearly endanger the monetary policy framework of the ESCB and the reputation of the ECB. In addition, it would call into question further adjustment programmes in other euro area member countries and would risk pushing the banking systems in other insolvency-prone countries into difficulties. Having said this, it seems legitimate to ask whether it is better to proceed to debt rescheduling right away. Therefore, a rapid debt restructuring could be a reasonable alternative
on the set of assumptions.
Scenario 1: Full repayment
In this scenario loans are granted repeatedly within a period of 5 year and Greece is assumed to be able to return to the capital markets and repay all its loans immediately in 2015. We assume a Greek “retained amount” (own contribution) of EUR 5 billion per year stemming from privatisation proceeds. Hence, Greece is assumed to be quite successful in selling state-owned
enterprises, but not to the extent aimed at (EUR 50 billion), but only by half. The German taxpayer would have been made liable for the Greek rescue at the amount of EUR 19.2 billion. This appears to be quite cheap and the costs are mainly due to the implementation of the ESM. What is more, at first glance scenario 1 turns out to be the cheapest variant. However, some critics – mostly defenders of the “business as usual” scenario- might ask why the costs of scenario 1 are still so high. The latter mainly results from the fact that we see the cash deposit in the ESM as lost since we assume that the ESM will become a permanent institution. The cash deposit is actually designated for the implementation of the ESM. The latter is a new institution which would not have been given birth without the EU debt crisis and, hence, has to be ascribed to the crisis. Germany cannot dispose of the deposit anymore, except in the case of a dissolution of the ESM. However, there could be interest paid on the deposit. But in this case costs resulting from additional loan taking have to be counted against these potential interest gains. Hence, one could not pretend that the deposit can be paid from the abundant tax revenues. The opportunity costs of the deposit are huge. In any case, the German taxpayer is financially liable for it. As an alternative, for instance, the value added tax could have been lowered by three percentage points in Germany. But the discounted costs of the deposit do represent not more than a level effect under the different scenarios. The assumption of a permanent ESM is not unrealistic even under scenario 1 according to which Greece will recover from scratch. The public choice literature makes it overall plausible that there are ratchet effects in the existence of
institutions. Once they are created, it will be quite difficult to get rid of them. But our scenario 1 is not overly realistic anymore (this view was valid at least until 3 June 2011, the day when the Troika quite surprisingly announced that Greece is on a proper way to meet its obligations within the adjustment programme). Thomas Mayer, chief economist of Deutsche Bank expressed it in the following way: ‘It would have been a miracle to happen for Greece in the near future to be able to return to the markets again. Oil should be found in the Aegean or the like’ (Nienhaus, 2011).
Scenario 3: No EU loan will be paid back
However, in the recent months it has become more and more likely that Greece will not recover and not pay back any loan from the first EU rescue package. Greece might default on the EU loans in 2015, i.e. on loans already disbursed and on the refinancing needs in the coming 4 years, i.e. the refinancing granted until
Scenario 2 – “Soft debt restructuring” – 1/3 of EU loans will be paid back
In an intermediate scenario Greece will only serve one third of its refinancing needs. In this realistic case, the costs for Germany will increase to EUR 38 billion. But this calculation appears to be too optimistic as well, since it assumes that privatisations are pushed through without any significant resistance. Moreover, ‘soft restructuring’ might represent the worst solution at all with an eye on the fact that the ECB continues to lend against sovereign bonds of the defaulting country. This would clearly endanger the monetary policy framework of the ESCB and the reputation of the ECB. In addition, it would call into question further adjustment programmes in other euro area member countries and would risk pushing the banking systems in other insolvency-prone countries into difficulties. Having said this, it seems legitimate to ask whether it is better to proceed to debt rescheduling right away. Therefore, a rapid debt restructuring could be a reasonable alternative
(scenarios 4 and 5)
Immediate debt restructuring: Scenarios 4 and 5
Scenario 4: Restructuring of Greek debt
A haircut of 50 percent is assumed, i.e. Greece
option of debt restructuring is not necessarily associated with higher costs than the muddling through scenario – even if one assumes under the alternative that Greece will pay back one third of EU loans after all in 2015 (scenario 2). In any case, the rescheduling has to be implemented rather quickly. The sooner it will be enacted, the faster Greece will recover, and the cheaper this alternative will be. Note that we have not included the cost incurred by the ECB.8 ‘Whether the ECB will have to materialise its losses immediately is controversial. Many economists argue that the ECB could stretch the losses and pay just a few years less or no profits to the national governments’.
option of debt restructuring is not necessarily associated with higher costs than the muddling through scenario – even if one assumes under the alternative that Greece will pay back one third of EU loans after all in 2015 (scenario 2). In any case, the rescheduling has to be implemented rather quickly. The sooner it will be enacted, the faster Greece will recover, and the cheaper this alternative will be. Note that we have not included the cost incurred by the ECB.8 ‘Whether the ECB will have to materialise its losses immediately is controversial. Many economists argue that the ECB could stretch the losses and pay just a few years less or no profits to the national governments’.
Scenario 5: Contagion Effects – Restructuring of Greek, Irish and Portuguese debt
A Greek debt restructuring might give rise to doubts whether the debt burden of Portugal and Ireland
whether these countries will adhere to their adjustment programmes. This might lead to contagion effects. As a consequence, both countries might have to reschedule their debt as well. In this case, the costs of the debt restructuring scenario will rise substantially to EUR 42.3 billion.10
whether these countries will adhere to their adjustment programmes. This might lead to contagion effects. As a consequence, both countries might have to reschedule their debt as well. In this case, the costs of the debt restructuring scenario will rise substantially to EUR 42.3 billion.10
ΕΠΙΣΗΜΑΝΣΗ Ι
5. THE SECOND GREEK RESCUE PACKAGE
Αccording to their meeting on 19/20 June 2011, the euro area Ministers of Finance intend to grant new loans to the highly
indebted Greece only if the Greek government has agreed upon new austerity measures. Moreover there appears to be a Greek package II in the pipeline. The details of which, however, are not specified for the public right now. Nevertheless, we try to assess the implications of the implementation of such a second package for the ranking of our scenarios 1 to 3. Note that the new EUR 12
billion loans which are envisaged for Greece in July and that are currently at the heart of the fierce discussions are already taken into account in our scenarios 1 to 5 above. In general, our calculation looks as follows. The Greek gross refinancing needs over the next three years (until mid-2014) amount to about EUR 172 billion. This amount accrues from
–bonds (EUR 85 billion) and loans (EUR 6 billion) which become mature,
–repayment to the IMF (EUR 5 billion),
–public budget deficit (EUR 38 billion), and
–additional financing needs of nearly EUR 40 billion to reduce the high amounts of short-term assets, to build up the Treasury cash buffer and the Greek contribution to the ESM where no opting out is possible.
Within the previous first Greek programme there are still EUR 57 billion of loans outstanding. Hence, the net financing needs amount to EUR 115 billion – under the assumption that Greece will not be able to refinance itself via the capital markets until mid-2014. This amount can potentially be reduced by privatisation efforts. If one, for instance, assumes away any privatisation proceeds, an additional amount of EUR 115 billion emerges. Two thirds of this amount is allotted to the EFSF/ESM, i.e. roughly EUR 80 billion. The German share is again calculated according to Germany’s ECB (fully paid in) capital share of 27.9 percent. Hence, Germany’s exposure amounts to roughly EUR 22 billion. In our simulations we assume that the allocation of loans over the years is the same as in the first Greek package and add the year-specific realisation of the loan to the refinancing needs of the respective year. The EFSF/ESM share and, thus, also Germany’s exposure could well be lower if one assumes a significant private
sector involvement. However, we feel legitimised to expect not too much from this source. Our simulation results show that the German exposure amounts to EUR 20 billion if Greece repays all of the additional loans received (scenario 1 modified). The costs for the German taxpayer increase if we assume a 1/3 repayment and are even higher (EUR 75 billion), if there will be no repayment at all (scenarios 2 and 3 modified). Scenarios 4 and 5 are not impacted by the envisaged second Greek rescue package. On the whole, thus, debt restructuring (scenarios 4 and 5) becomes even more preferable if we assume the implementation of a second Greek loan package.
indebted Greece only if the Greek government has agreed upon new austerity measures. Moreover there appears to be a Greek package II in the pipeline. The details of which, however, are not specified for the public right now. Nevertheless, we try to assess the implications of the implementation of such a second package for the ranking of our scenarios 1 to 3. Note that the new EUR 12
billion loans which are envisaged for Greece in July and that are currently at the heart of the fierce discussions are already taken into account in our scenarios 1 to 5 above. In general, our calculation looks as follows. The Greek gross refinancing needs over the next three years (until mid-2014) amount to about EUR 172 billion. This amount accrues from
–bonds (EUR 85 billion) and loans (EUR 6 billion) which become mature,
–repayment to the IMF (EUR 5 billion),
–public budget deficit (EUR 38 billion), and
–additional financing needs of nearly EUR 40 billion to reduce the high amounts of short-term assets, to build up the Treasury cash buffer and the Greek contribution to the ESM where no opting out is possible.
Within the previous first Greek programme there are still EUR 57 billion of loans outstanding. Hence, the net financing needs amount to EUR 115 billion – under the assumption that Greece will not be able to refinance itself via the capital markets until mid-2014. This amount can potentially be reduced by privatisation efforts. If one, for instance, assumes away any privatisation proceeds, an additional amount of EUR 115 billion emerges. Two thirds of this amount is allotted to the EFSF/ESM, i.e. roughly EUR 80 billion. The German share is again calculated according to Germany’s ECB (fully paid in) capital share of 27.9 percent. Hence, Germany’s exposure amounts to roughly EUR 22 billion. In our simulations we assume that the allocation of loans over the years is the same as in the first Greek package and add the year-specific realisation of the loan to the refinancing needs of the respective year. The EFSF/ESM share and, thus, also Germany’s exposure could well be lower if one assumes a significant private
sector involvement. However, we feel legitimised to expect not too much from this source. Our simulation results show that the German exposure amounts to EUR 20 billion if Greece repays all of the additional loans received (scenario 1 modified). The costs for the German taxpayer increase if we assume a 1/3 repayment and are even higher (EUR 75 billion), if there will be no repayment at all (scenarios 2 and 3 modified). Scenarios 4 and 5 are not impacted by the envisaged second Greek rescue package. On the whole, thus, debt restructuring (scenarios 4 and 5) becomes even more preferable if we assume the implementation of a second Greek loan package.
ΕΠΙΣΗΜΑΝΣΗ ΙΙ
6. OPTIONS FOR ACTION
Greek debt restructuring is across all realistic scenarios on average cheaper than sticking to sequential and even larger loan
packages. All micro- and macro economic indicators show by now, that Greece will not recover by simply granting additional loans. However, there should emerge significant credibility gains from a quick and persuading haircut.
packages. All micro- and macro economic indicators show by now, that Greece will not recover by simply granting additional loans. However, there should emerge significant credibility gains from a quick and persuading haircut.
ΕΠΙΣΗΜΑΝΣΗ ΙΙΙ
What strikes us most after having done all the calculations is the fact that our considerations and priors in some of our previous briefing papers concerning the role of the ECB as the bad bank for the euro area (‘Can central banks go bankrupt?’, Belke 2010a, 2010b) turned out to be completely true and have gained so much importance within the last twelve months.15 In the meantime increases in ECB capital stock became necessary and dramatic decreases in the quality of assets on its balance sheets became obvious. Taking this as a starting point, the most important benefit of a timely restructuring of Greek debt would be to avoid destroying the reputation of the ECB!
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